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UNIFORM LAWS OR STATE IMMUNITY?
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION
106(A) AFTER SEMINOLE
JOHN F. HILTZ*

I.

A FRESH START

Julie Smith is in financial trouble. She has recently lost her
job and is a single parent with two children to support. Although
she has been looking for work, her savings are quickly depleting.
Soon, Julie is forced to take a position paying $30,000 a year less
than she was making at her previous job. The income from this
new job is not sufficient, and Julie becomes overwhelmed by her
debt. Julie decides, in the end, that her only way out is to declare
bankruptcy. Julie is not alone.1 More and more Americans are
declaring bankruptcy every year.2 All of them are trying to get a
fresh start. This is one of the main purposes behind bankruptcy.3
Similarly, Julie's creditors also want to be treated fairly when her
assets are divided amongst them. This, after all, is the second
major purpose behind bankruptcy."
*

J.D., May 2006, The John Marshall Law School. The author wishes to

say "Muchos Gracias" to Paul Orser and Teresa Sanhueza whose support so
long ago will never be forgotten. The author also thanks the previous and
current editorial boards, especially Jennifer Hagberg and Manish Mehta, for
their comprehensive editing of this comment. The author is very grateful to
Professor Paul Lewis for inspiring an interest in this topic as well as providing
continual advice and guidance throughout the past three years. Finally, the
author wises to dedicate this comment to his family, especially his wife,
Virginia, for her constant love and support.
1. Press Release, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Number of
Bankruptcy Cases Filed in Federal Courts Down Less Than One Percent (Aug.
27, 2004), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/PressReleases/june04bk.pdf
(last visited Jan. 28, 2005). The total number of non-business bankruptcies
filed in federal court in the twelve-month period ending June 30, 2004 was
1,599,986. Id.
2. Id. From 1999 to 2004 the number of non-business bankruptcy filings
in federal court has risen from 1,352,030 to 1,599,986 per year. Id.
3. Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502, 514 (1938). "The
development of bankruptcy legislation has been towards relieving the honest
debtor from oppressive indebtedness and permitting him to start afresh." Id.
4. See Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471, 477 (1968) (holding that an
important objective of bankruptcy is fairness to all creditors having claims
against the debtor).
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These two ideas, a fresh start for the debtor and fairness
towards the creditors, were so important to the founding fathers
that they entrusted Congress with a specific grant of power "[t]o
establish.., uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies
throughout the United States."' However, if Julie has student
loans, and those loans are guaranteed by a state agency, she and
her creditors may discover that the two main purposes of
bankruptcy law might not be so easily achieved.6
One of the largest hurdles to Julie's fresh start and fair
treatment for her creditors lies in the uncertainty surrounding the
constitutionality of section 106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.7
Section 106(a) is Congress's attempt to abrogate State sovereign
immunity.8 If section 106(a) is constitutional, then the creditor
state or state agency is not immune from suit,9 and will be treated
like a normal creditor." If section 106(a) is unconstitutional, then
the state agency guaranteeing her student loan may be able to
avoid discharge. This is so even if a bankruptcy court discharges

5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
6. As we will see later, if section 106(a) is invalid, states may be able to
avoid the bankruptcy proceeding and Julie's loans will not be discharged. This
would frustrate her ability to get a fresh start and may well prevent her
creditors from receiving payment they may have otherwise been entitled.
7. 11 U.S.C. § 106(a) (2000). The act states in part: "Notwithstanding an
assertion of sovereign immunity, sovereign immunity is abrogated as to a
governmental unit to the extent set forth in this section ....
" Id. The
constitutionality of this section is uncertain and there is currently a split
among courts as to whether Congress was acting within its power to enact this
section of code. See Dep't of Transp. & Dev. v. PNL Asset Mgmt. Co. (In re
Fernandez), 123 F.3d 241, 246 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996)) (holding that section 106(a) is unconstitutional
because Congress lacks authority under the bankruptcy clause as well as
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution). See also Sacred
Heart Hosp. v. Pa. Dep't of Pub. Welfare (In re Sacred Heart Hosp.), 133 F.3d
237, 245 (3rd Cir. 1998) (concluding that because Congress lacks the authority
to abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to any Article I powers and
because Congress did not enact section 106(a) pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment, it must be unconstitutional). But see Wilson v. South Car. State
Educ. Assistant Auth. (In re Wilson), 258 B.R. 303, 307-08 (Bankr. S.D. Ga.
2001) (holding that section 106(a) was a valid abrogation of state sovereign
immunity because Congress was acting under the power of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
For a discussion concerning the internal split among
bankruptcy courts in Tennessee see generally Shauna Fuller Veach, Dissension
Among the Ranks - The Courts Are at Odds Over 11 U.S.C. § 106 and Its
Purported Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity in the Bankruptcy Code, 32 U.
MEM. L. REV. 475, 510-14 (2002) (discussing the internal conflicts among the
various bankruptcy districts within Tennessee as to whether section 106 is a
valid abrogation of sovereign immunity).
8. 11 U.S.C. § 106(a).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. Otherwise state sovereign immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment would allow the state to avoid the proceedings. Id.
10. 11 U.S.C. § 106(a).
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the loans on the theory that Congress cannot prevent the State, or
an agency acting on its behalf, from exercising its Eleventh
Amendment protection to avoid the bankruptcy proceeding."
Part II of this Comment will briefly address Congressional
power under the Bankruptcy Clause and its limitations. It will
also examine the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments of the
Constitution and the effect they have on Congressional power and
State immunity.
Part III will examine how both the Supreme Court and the
lower courts decided cases involving the constitutionality of
section 106(a). It will also explore the arguments for and against
the validity of section 106(a).
Part IV will propose that the Supreme Court declare that
section 106(a) is constitutional, thereby preventing States from
avoiding bankruptcy proceedings, putting the current uncertainty
to rest, thereby restoring the two major purposes of bankruptcy.
II. A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
A. Bankruptcy and the Constitution
Article 1, section 8 of the Constitution grants Congress the
power "[t]o establish ... uniform Laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies throughout the United States." 2 But, it has not
been established just how far this power extends. Could Congress
abrogate States' sovereign immunity afforded them under the
Eleventh Amendment and force States to either join in the
bankruptcy proceeding or forfeit their rights as creditors? 3 Prior
to 1996, the answer seemed obvious: Congress did have the power
to abrogate States' Eleventh Amendment immunity, so long as it
was acting pursuant to a valid power."' In 1996, however, the

11. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. This is explained in much greater detail in
Part III.
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. It is not technically correct to say that the
Eleventh Amendment is the source of state sovereign immunity. Karen
Cordry, Sovereign Immunity - Time to Come in from the Cold!, AM. BANKR.
INST. J., Sept. 13, 1994, at 5-6. The Amendment merely symbolizes the

sovereign immunity that was there all along. Id. It should not be understood

as setting boundaries for the immunity, rather it reaffirms the common law
immunity that existed before the constitution, as well as today. Id.
14. See Texas v. Walker, 142 F.3d 813, 820 (5th Cir. 1998) (stating that
prior to Seminole an individual could have debt owed to a state discharged);
Sacred Heart, 133 F.3d at 242 (acknowledging two sources of authority, prior
to Seminole, that allowed Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity: the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Interstate Commerce Clause). See also
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 23 (1989) (holding that Article I
powers (specifically the Commerce Clause) grants Congress the authority to
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Supreme Court's decision in a non-bankruptcy case cast serious
doubt on Congress' ability to abrogate States' immunity from suit,
including bankruptcy proceedings. 5 The effect Seminole Tribe v.
Florida had on the bankruptcy world was initially pointed out by
6
Justice Stevens in the dissent."
For abrogation via section 106(a) to be valid, Congress must
act pursuant to a valid exercise of its constitutional power. 17 In
Seminole, the Court found that abrogating States' immunity
pursuant to the Commerce Clause"8 was not a valid exercise of
Congressional power. 9 Although the Court did not specifically
rule on the constitutionality of abrogation via the Bankruptcy
Clause, lower courts broadly interpreted the Seminole ruling to
cover all Article I, section 8 powers." Although there is some case
law to the contrary,2' it would appear that Seminole presents a
serious obstacle to Congress' attempt to justify enactment of
section 106(a) with power granted by the Bankruptcy Clause.

abrogate state sovereign immunity). This case was explicitly overturned by
Seminole. 517 U.S. at 66.
15. Seminole, 517 U.S. 44.
16. See id. at 77 (stating that the majority's opinion would prevent
Congress from providing a federal forum for actions against states concerning
bankruptcies) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 55. The Court fashions a two step test to determine if Congress
has validly abrogated State's Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. The first
step of the test is whether Congress has clearly stated its intent to abrogate.
Id. In the case of section 106(a) the answer is obviously yes. Pitts v. OH.
Dep't of Tax. (In Re Pitts), 241 B.R. 862, 876 (Bankr. N.D. OH. 1999). The
second step requires a determination if Congress has acted pursuant to a valid
source of power. Seminole, 517 U.S. at 55. See Richard Lieb, Development:
Eleventh Amendment Immunity of A State in Bankruptcy Cases: A New
Jurisdictional Approach, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 269, 287 (1999)
(discussing requirements for abrogation in general). It is clear that Congress
assumed that it had the power pursuant to Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 (the
Bankruptcy Clause) to abrogate state sovereign immunity and that by clearly
expressing its intent to do so via section 106(a). Id.
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
19. Seminole, 517 U.S. at 77 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (holding that because
the purpose of the Eleventh Amendment is to curtail the power under Article
III, Article I cannot be used as a way around these limitations).
20. See In re NVR L.P., 206 B.R. 831, 838 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997) (pointing
out that the majority of courts have found section 106(a) unconstitutional
since Seminole).
21. See Wilson, 258 B.R. at 306 (concluding that section 106(a) is
constitutional). See Hood v. Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. (In re Hood), 319
F.3d 755, 767 (6th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter Hood 1] (becoming the first federal
circuit court to hold that section 106(a) is constitutional). See, e.g., Bliemeister
v. Indus. Comm'n of Ariz. (In re Bliemeister), 251 B.R. 383, 391-92 (Bankr. D.
Ariz. 2000) (holding that the states waived their sovereign immunity when
they ratified the Constitution).
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B. The FourteenthAmendment: Another Way?
Article I is not the only tool available to Congress in its
attempt to abrogate State sovereign immunity." The Fourteenth
Amendment grants protections to the citizens of the United States
and empowers Congress to enforce those protections. 2 There is
little question on whether Congress can abrogate a State's
Eleventh Amendment immunity by exercising its Fourteenth
Amendment powers.24
The only question, then, is whether
Congress is acting pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment when
it enacts a piece of legislation. 5
22. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (noting that congress
also has power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). In Ex parte
Young, the Supreme Court articulated what is known as the "Exparte Young
Doctrine," which allows an individual to bring suit against a state official,
acting in his official capacity, as a way to avoid offending the Eleventh
Amendment. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). The doctrine creates a legal fiction that the
official was not acting under direction of the sovereign and, therefore, does not
have immunity. Id. at 167. While not abrogation of immunity as such, it
provides a way for a citizen to get injunctive relief against a state. Id. S.
Elizabeth Gibson, How to Deal With a State in Bankruptcy in a Post-Seminole
World?, in

WAIVER OF ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY: THE DEBATE

CONTINUES 12, 23 (1999) (explaining that the Ex parte Young fiction is
necessary to protect federal rights against states).
23. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment prevents
states from enacting or enforcing "any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id. "The
Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article." Id. at § 5.
24. See Dodson v. Tenn. Student Assistance Corp., 259 B.R. 635, 638
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2001) (stating that Congress may authorize a state to be
sued by exercising its Fourteenth Amendment power). In examining the
relationship between the Eleventh Amendment and the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court noted that section 5 expressly grants Congress the
power to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, which already
inherently limit state authority, "by appropriate legislation." Fitzpatrick, 427
U.S. at 456. The Court further explained that by acting pursuant to Section 5
of the Fourteenth amendment, Congress is exercising plenary authority via a
section of an Amendment that already limits state power. Id. In deciding
which legislation is appropriate, Congress may provide for suits against states
that might otherwise be barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Id.
25. See College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd., 148 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (explaining the test used to
determine if a particular piece of legislation was passed pursuant to the
powers granted by the Fourteenth Amendment). When deciding if a piece of
legislation was enacted pursuant to an appropriate use of Congress's
Fourteenth Amendment power, the Supreme Court will allow Congress to use
any rational means to enforce the provisions of that Amendment. Id. The
Supreme Court consistently looks to Chief Justice Marshall's explanation of
the powers of Congress: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of
the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and
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In considering whether section 106(a) was enacted pursuant
to the Fourteenth Amendment, one must first determine if
bankruptcy is one of the rights protected in section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment."
Section 1 provides that:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.27
Congress is not required to specifically state that they are
acting pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. 8 Although there
are no "magic words" that signify that Congress is acting under
the power of the Fourteenth Amendment, 9 the legislation must
correspond to some recognizable Fourteenth Amendment
protection. 9
C. States'Answer: The Eleventh Amendment
The Eleventh Amendment prevents citizens from bringing
suit against a State.2 ' Although the language says that a State

spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." Id. (citing McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. 314 (1819)). See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
517-18 (1997) (With regard to Congress' enforcement power under the
Fourteenth Amendment: "Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted
to carry out the objects the amendments have in view, whatever tends to
enforce submission to the prohibitions they contain... if not prohibited, is
brought within the domain of congressional power." (quoting Ex parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46,(1880))).
26. The question has not been answered decisively. See Pitts, 241 B.R. at
876 (rejecting the argument that section 106(a) was enacted through the
Fourteenth Amendment). But see Wilson, 258 B.R. at 306 (finding that in
enacting § 106(a), Congress had acted pursuant to their Fourteenth
Amendment powers).
27. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

28. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 244, n.18 (1983). In EEOC v.
Wyoming, the Court stated '[tihat does not mean, however, that Congress
need anywhere recite the words 'section 5' or 'Fourteenth Amendment' or
'equal

protection,'..

.

for '[the] ... constitutionality of action taken by

Congress does not depend on recitals of the power which it undertakes to
exercise.'" Id. (citing Woods v. Cloyed W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948)).
29. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 244 (explaining that no specific
words are required in order to utilize Fourteenth Amendment powers).
30. Id. The Supreme Court will review legislation passed by Congress that
is being presented as constitutional because it was enacted pursuant to
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in order to determine if there is a
legitimate purpose that supports the use of that power. Id.
31. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The amendment provides that "[tihe judicial

power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law
or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." Id.
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cannot be sued by a citizen of another State, courts have construed
that language to also prevent suits against States by their own
Because a State is protected by the Eleventh
citizens."
Amendment, without a valid abrogation of this protection or
another way to compel the State to submit to the court's
jurisdiction," a bankruptcy proceeding would be unable to
discharge debt owed to a creditor State.34 Although almost
assuredly not the intent of the Eleventh Amendment, 5 the result
of such immunity frustrates of the very intent of the Bankruptcy
Clause."

32. Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 451 U.S. 440, 444-45 (2004)
[hereinafter Hood II]. "For over a century, however, we have recognized that
the States' sovereign immunity is not limited to the literal terms of the
Eleventh Amendment." Id. For example, in Hans v. Louisiana the Court
stated that the purpose and breadth of the Eleventh Amendment was as
follows:
It is not necessary that we should enter upon an examination of the
reason or expediency of... [state sovereign immunity] which exempts a
sovereign State from prosecution in a court of justice at the suit of
individuals. This is fully discussed by writers on public law. It is
enough for us to declare its existence. The legislative department of a
State represents its polity and its will; and is called upon by the highest
demands of natural and political law to preserve justice and judgment,
and to hold inviolate the public obligations. Any departure from this
rule, except for reasons most cogent, (of which the legislature, and not
the courts, is the judge,) never fails in the end to incur the odium of the
world, and to bring lasting injury upon the State itself. But to deprive
the legislature of the power of judging what the honor and safety of the
State may require, even at the expense of a temporary failure to
discharge the public debts, would be attended with greater evils than
such failure can cause.
134 U.S. 1, 21 (1890) (emphasis added).
33. The recent Supreme Court case Hood I provides another way to compel
the state to submit to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction. 451 U.S. 440. This
issue will be discussed in much greater detail in Parts III and IV.
34. Unless, of course, the State consented to suit thereby waiving its
Eleventh Amendment protection.
Otherwise the state will escape the
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
35. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 325 (1934). The
Court held that the catalyst for the Eleventh Amendment, "in Chisholm v.
Georgia, over the vigorous dissent of Mr. Justice Iredell, that a State was
liable to suit by a citizen of another State or of a foreign country. But this
decision created such a shock of surprise that the Eleventh Amendment was at
once proposed and adopted... ."). Id. See John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh
Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation,83 COLUM. L.
REV. 1889, 1921-23 (1983) (discussing the relevant political backdrop of
Chisholm and the goal of maintaining the peace treaty between the United
States and Great Britain).
36. By avoiding suit, the state can disrupt Congress' ability to "establish...
uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
Such avoidance will also frustrate the ability of the debtor to get a fresh start,
one of the major goals of bankruptcy. Wright, 304 U.S. at 514.
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1. Shock and Surprise: Chisholm Causes the Adoption of the
Eleventh Amendment
To fully understand the role that the Eleventh Amendment
can play in bankruptcy proceedings, it is necessary to examine the
events leading up to the enactment of the Amendment, as well as
the reasoning behind its adoption."
The concept of sovereign
immunity was introduced to this country under the British
common-law.'
Simply put, it means that the King can do no
wrong; and thus cannot be sued.39 The concept was discussed and
debated at the Constitutional Convention in Virginia." In the end,
the concept of sovereign immunity did not make its way into the
Constitution, in part at least, because the Constitution called for a
federal government with broad powers that would override any
sovereignty that States might have held.4'
In 1793, the Supreme Court handed down a decision that
compelled Congress to quickly reassess this omission. '
In
Chisholm v. Georgia, the Supreme Court allowed a citizen of South
Carolina to sue the state of Georgia for unpaid Revolutionary War
debts.'
The Court reasoned that Article III vested the federal
courts with jurisdiction in cases between citizens and states," and
moreover, that forcing a State to submit to the jurisdiction of the

37. See generally Gibbons, supra note 35 (giving an overview of the
historical context in which the Eleventh Amendment was enacted). It is worth
noting that the Ex parte Young doctrine only allows injunctive relief against
the state. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105
(1984) (explaining that the significance of Edleman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,
663 (1974), is that the Supreme Court did not allow the Ex parte Young
doctrine to apply to retroactive relief). Other forms of relief, such as monetary
damages, are not available to the plaintiff. Id. As such, Ex parte Young is far
from a complete substitution for Congressional abrogation.
38. Christina M. Royer, ParadiseLost? State Employees'Rights in the Wake
of "New Federalism",34 AKRON L. REV. 637, 640 (2001).
39. Id.
A close look at the eighteenth century concept of sovereign
immunity will illuminate some large differences between Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity and the sovereign immunity that was
enjoyed by the king. Gibbons, supra note 35, at 1895. The king's immunity
extended no further than himself; the immunity was personal, it did not
extend to the government as a whole. Id. at 1895-96. This common law notion
later evolved with the petition of "right," a writ by which suit could be brought
against the monarch. Id. at 1896. This effectively eliminated the traditional
notion of sovereign immunity. Id. "Thus the true meaning of the English
expression 'the king can do no wrong' was that the king would do no wrong, for
if he did, the petition of right would set wrongs right." Id.
40. Royer, supra note 38, at 640-41.
41. Id. at 641.
42. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 419.
43. Id. at 480.
44. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. "The judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases... between a State and Citizens of another State .... " Id.
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federal court was not a "degradation of sovereignty" of the State.4 5
Likely concerned with the possibility of being haled into federal
court and forced to pay revolutionary war debt themselves, the
States responded.'
The reaction to the Chisholm decision was
"swift and hostile,"47 and within two years, the Eleventh
Amendment was enacted.'
2.

The Eleventh Amendment Grows Stronger

Although on its face the Eleventh Amendment only bars suits
against States by citizens of another state, such a plain language
interpretation was rejected by the Court as illogical. 49 The Court
in Hans v. Louisiana construed the Eleventh Amendment to apply
to suits against a State even by its own citizens. °
This
interpretation greatly increased the scope of State sovereign
immunity, and States were now immune from suit brought by any
private individual.51 Since Hans, there has been little change in
the scope of the Eleventh Amendment. Even today, with one

45. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 419.
46. Welch v. Tex. Dep't. of Highways, 483 U.S. 468, 484 (1987). See
Gibbons, supra note 35, at 1894 (noting that the argument is that it was not
the "shock and surprise" generated by the Chisholm decision that caused the
ratification of the Eleventh Amendment). Nor was the Eleventh Amendment
an attempt order to restore the original concept that states were immune from
all suits and that Article III had never authorized such suits in the first place.
Id. Instead, the Eleventh Amendment was merely a "narrow and technical
redefinition" of the section of Article III that grants jurisdiction in suits
between states and citizens of other states. Id.
47. Welch, 483 U.S. at 484.
48. Id.
49. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 15 (concluding that the mere suggestion that the
states would have ratified the Eleventh Amendment if it had contained a
provision allowing them to be sued by their own citizens was "almost an
absurdity on its face").
50. Id.
51. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (holding that Congress
lacks the power to subject states to private suits in state courts). With this
ruling, states are immune from suits by private citizens in both federal and
state courts. Id. In explaining the apparent broadening of the scope of the
Eleventh Amendment, the Alden court explains that such rulings only affirm a
well-settled view held by the "leading advocates of the Constitution's
ratification." Id. at 728. The idea is that state sovereign immunity does not
spring from the Eleventh Amendment but is instead inherent in the very
structure of the Constitution itself. Id. All the Eleventh Amendment did was
to restate that immunity. Id. As such, it is logical that the full scope of such
sovereign immunity is not dictated solely by the Eleventh Amendment, but
incorporates instead the fundamental principle required by the very nature of
the Constitution. Id. at 729.
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exception,52 unless State sovereign immunity is validly abrogated,'
States are immune from suits brought by individuals.'
3.

The Eleventh Amendment vs. Bankruptcy

When the state, or state agency, is a creditor in a bankruptcy
proceeding, the possibility exists for the State to assert its
Eleventh Amendment immunity. This situation is most common
when dealing with the issue of student loans. Although it is true
that student loans are generally not dischargeable through
bankruptcy proceedings, they can be discharged if found to present
an undue hardship to the debtor.55 States waive their sovereign
immunity by participating in any part of the proceeding, including
the undue hardship hearing.' The question of sovereign immunity
thus arises when the State does not participate, but instead
watches from the sidelines to see the result. Then, if the loans are
discharged, the State can raise the Eleventh Amendment
argument.57

52. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 123. See supra note 22 (explaining the Ex
parte Young doctrine).
53. See generally U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1 (indicating that the
abrogation need not be explicitly stated in a statute). Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, for example, States are subject to suits from private individuals
if the State deprives the individual of their "life, liberty, or property" without
first providing the individual with a hearing and the full protection of due
process. Id. Similarly, the State cannot deny any individual equal protection.
Id.
54. See supra note 51 (explaining that the full scope of state sovereign
immunity prevents suits against states by all individuals, regardless of their
home state).
55. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(8) (2004). The statute explains that a general
discharge will not include debt:
unless excepting such debt from discharge under this paragraph will
impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor's dependents for
an educational benefit overpayment or loan made, insured or
guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made under any program funded
in whole or in part by a governmental unit or nonprofit institution; or an
obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit, scholarship
or stipend ....
Id.
56. Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565, 574 (1947). In Gardner, the
Court explained that "[w]hen the state becomes the actor and files a claim
against the fund, it waives any immunity which it otherwise might have had
respecting the adjudication of the claim." Id.
57. Hood H, 541 U.S. at 449. "Thus, the major difference between the
discharge of a student loan debt and the discharge of most other debts is that
governmental creditors, including States, that choose not to submit
themselves to the court's jurisdiction might still receive some benefit: The
debtor's personal liability on the loan may survive the discharge." Id. at 450.
This explains that the presumption is that the debt will not be discharged. Id.
at 449. The debtor may be granted an "undue hardship" determination, which
would then cause the court to discharge the debt. Id. At this point the state,
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D. The Collision between Section 106(a) and Sovereign Immunity
What should the bankruptcy court do in Julie's situation? On
one hand, the doctrine of State sovereign immunity is well
established and appears to protect the State from unwillingly
participating in the proceeding. On the other hand, the main
tenets of bankruptcy would seem to require that Julie be given an
opportunity for a fresh start and that her creditors be treated
fairly. However, these two theories are clearly at odds with each
other. The courts have struggled with this issue and the Supreme
Court has not only refused to decisively answer the question, but
ironically, has itself added to the quandary. These questions will
be discussed in greater detail in Part III.

III. A DEEPER LOOK
A. The Ramifications of Seminole in Lower Courts
Although Seminole did not deal directly with bankruptcy law,
the dissent was prophetic in its concern that other Article I
powers, such as bankruptcy, would be greatly affected by this
ruling.' In the first bankruptcy cases to reach the U.S. courts of
appeals after the Seminole ruling, the courts were essentially
united in their handling of section 106(a). 59 According to the
courts, although section 106(a) expressly states Congress' intent to
abrogate state sovereign immunity, it was unconstitutional
because it was enacted pursuant to an Article I power and not
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.'
The courts found
several different arguments in favor of abrogation of state
sovereign immunity unpersuasive; most of which were handled
identically by each individual circuit."

or state agency, must either act (thus waiving its Eleventh Amendment
immunity) or simply live with the Court's decision. Id. Thus, the state is
stuck between the proverbial rock and a hard place: either submit to the

court's jurisdiction, or live with its decision. Id. This is the crux of the
argument that the Eleventh Amendment is being offended. Id.
58. Seminole, 517 U.S. at 77 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority did not
seem to agree. Id. at 73. The majority claims that bankruptcy statutes do not
attempt to abrogate state sovereign immunity. Id. It would seem, based upon
the straightforward wording of section 106(a), that the majority was simply
mistaken.
59. See generally Sacred Heart, 133 F.3d 237; Fernandez, 123 F.3d 241;
Schlossberg v. Maryland (In re Creative Goldsmiths), 119 F.3d 1140 (4th Cir.
1997); Nelson v. Wisconsin (In re Nelson), 301 F.3d 820 (7th Cir. 2002);
Mitchell v. California (In re Mitchell), 209 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2000). Each of
these cases held that section 106(a) was unconstitutional.
60. See, e.g., In re Creative Goldsmiths, 119 F.3d at 1144-45 (determining
that although Congress had clearly intended to abrogate state sovereign

immunity, it did not do so pursuant to a valid exercise of power).
61. See discussion infra Part III.A.3 (regarding some of these arguments in
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Seminole does not apply

One argument to the validity of section 106(a) is that the
Seminole ruling only addressed the Indian and Interstate
Commerce Clauses and not the other Article I powers.'
The
courts quickly dismissed this argument, relying on Seminole and
concluding that no Article I power can be used to get around the
restriction that the Eleventh Amendment places on Article III.'
Similarly, the courts were not convinced by arguments that
"the Bankruptcy Clause is distinguishable from other Article I"
powers by nature of its uniformity requirement.'
The court, in
Sacred Heart Hospital v. Pennsylvania Department of Public
Welfare, pointed out that both the Bankruptcy Clause and the
Commerce Clause grant Congress "plenary power over national
economic activity."6
Additionally, according to the court, the
uniformity requirement is merely geographical and requires only
that the Eleventh Amendment apply to all States.' Other circuit
courts agree with these arguments.67 The court in Department of
Transportation& Development v. PNL Asset Management Co. (In
re Fernandez) added that the Framers intended the Bankruptcy
Clause and the Commerce Clause to be treated equivalently.'
2.

The FourteenthAmendment Validates Section 106(a)
The courts next considered whether there was any weight to
the argument that Congress acted pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment in passing section 106(a) and thus abrogating State
sovereign immunity. 9 All the circuits faced with this issue agreed:

lower bankruptcy courts).
62. Fernandez, 123 F.3d at 243-44.

63. Id.
64. SacredHeart, 133 F.3d at 243.

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., In re Creative Goldsmiths, 119 F.3d at 1145-46 (finding
unpersuasive the argument that the uniformity requirement requires the
Bankruptcy Clause to be treated differently than other Article I powers);
Fernandez, 123 F.3d at 244 (holding that the uniformity requirement is merely
a geographical requirement); Mitchell, 209 F.3d at 1119 (stating that there is
no uniformity exception to Seminole).

68. 123 F.3d at 244. The court relies on THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (James
Madison) which stated that uniform bankruptcy laws and the regulation of
commerce were "intimately connected." Id. See also Vanston Bondholders v.
Green, 329 U.S. 156, 172 (1946) (holding that the requirement of uniformity is
merely geographic and can be completely satisfied by similar treatment across
the country without regard to which state the proceedings take place).

69. Fernandez, 123 F.3d at 245. It is well settled that the Fourteenth
Amendment is a valid source of power, which would allow Congress to
abrogate State sovereign immunity; the question is only whether it was
properly invoked in section 106(a). Id.
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the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply to section 106(a). 0
The court in Fernandez found no evidence that section 106(a)
was passed pursuant to anything except the Article I power.71
Additionally, the court was reluctant to recognize the power of
Congress to pass substantive legislation pursuant to section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, because that "would render Eleventh
Amendment state sovereign immunity meaningless and eviscerate
the fundamental construct of federalism in our constitutional form
of government.""
The court in Mitchell v. California (In re Mitchell) agreed,
pointing out that for legislation enacted pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment to be valid, it must be remedial in
nature.73 The courts that dealt with this argument concluded that
section 106(a) was not passed pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment, and even if it had been, it was not remedial in
nature, and therefore, was unconstitutional.74
3.

The Constitution Validates Section 106(a)

At least two courts have dealt with more creative arguments
regarding the constitutionality of section 106(a)." In Mitchell, the
court rejected an argument that section 106(a) was unnecessary
because the Supremacy Clause overrides state law in the same
way that the Fourteenth Amendment intrudes "upon the province
of the Eleventh Amendment... ." The court agreed that the
Supremacy Clause requires federal law to trump state law, but
pointed out that it does not in and of itself abrogate state
sovereign immunity.77

70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See Mitchell, 209 F.3d at 1119 (explaining that Congress is limited to
passing legislation that is "appropriate;" the legislation must protect a right
recognized under the Fourteenth Amendment and the nature of the legislation
must be remedial).
74. In re Creative Goldsmiths, 119 F.3d at 1146-47.
To allow the
Fourteenth Amendment to apply in this situation would broaden the scope of
the Amendment so much as allow it to be used to "justify every federal
enforcement scheme as a requirement of due process." Id. See also Mitchell,
209 F.3d at 1119-20 (explaining that abrogation of state sovereign immunity

pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment must be "congruent and proportional"
to the right being protected and the way in which it is being protected). The
court in Mitchell would require Congressional findings that a state had
engaged in a "pattern of constitutional violations of federal bankruptcy law"
before legislation abrogating state sovereign immunity could be validly
enacted. Id. at 1120. Even then the legislation would need to be proportional

to the "remedial aims." Id.
75. Mitchell, 209 F.3d 1111; Nelson, 301 F.3d 820.

76. 209 F.3d at 1120-21.
77. Id. See also Alden, 527 U.S. at 731-32 (holding that the constitution
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In Nelson v. Wisconsin (In re Nelson), an argument that had
been successful in a few lower courts, including the lower court in
the Nelson case, was rejected. 8 The argument stressed that
section 106(a) is unnecessary because the states already
relinquished their immunity when they ratified the Constitution.
By ratifying the Bankruptcy Clause, which, according to the
argument, subjected the States to the federal bankruptcy laws as
well as abrogated their sovereign immunity in relation to those
laws, the States understood and agreed to give up their
immunity. 9 If true, the Eleventh Amendment does not apply since
it has been construed as merely restoring the sovereign immunity
that existed before Chisholm, and did not create any new
immunity. 9
None of these arguments were successful in convincing the
Courts of Appeals to rule that section 106(a) was valid. Only one
circuit bucked the trend and determined that section 106(a) was
valid."'
B. The 6th Circuit Hood Reasoning You Can Have Your Cake and Eat it Too
Instead of falling in line with the other circuits, the court in
Hood took a fresh look at the historical backdrop of the
Bankruptcy Clause and the Eleventh Amendment and determined
that even by applying Seminole, the Bankruptcy Clause did grant
Congress the authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity
because of its uniformity requirement.82
The court embraced precedent, following the direction of the
Supreme Court in Alden v. Maine, by looking at the structure of
the Constitution.8
The analysis quickly dispatched any
Fourteenth or Eleventh Amendment considerations as irrelevant.'
grants Congress the power to create the supreme law of the land but that does
not preclude a state from having immunity from certain claims arising under

that supreme law simply because the federal law is greater than the state
law).
78. 301 F.3d at 832. Nelson noted that several courts have held that
sovereign immunity was waived without section 106(a) even being necessary.

Id. at 832 n.13.
79. Id.
80. Id.

See Alden, 527 U.S. at 727-28 (stating that the Eleventh

Amendment merely corrected the mistake made by the Supreme Court in
Chisholm).

81. Hood 1, 319 F.3d at 768.
82. Id. at 768. Although other courts had determined that the uniformity
requirement was nothing more than a geographical requirement, the Sixth
Circuit did not dismiss the uniformity requirement so quickly.
83. Id. at 762.
84. Id. at 762 n.1. The court reasoned that the Eleventh Amendment is
inconsequential to the analysis because it only restored the concept of

sovereign immunity enjoyed by the states prior to Chisholm. Id. at 762. The
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Instead, the court focused on the actual language of the
Constitution, namely the word "uniform" in the Bankruptcy
Clause." Unlike the other circuits that determined that "uniform"
was related merely to geography, this court pointed out that there
is significance in the wording, stating that: "[t]he peculiar terms of
the grant certainly deserve notice. Congress is not authorized
merely to pass laws, the operation of which shall be uniform, but
to establish uniform laws on the subject throughout the United
States."
The notion that the uniformity requirement is merely
geographical arose from a concurring opinion and was not
controlling, since the issue according to the concurring opinion was
inconsistent with the majority opinion.87
The court then turned to the Federalist Papers for the
Framers' intent in drafting the Bankruptcy Clause.'
Relying
heavily on The Federalist Nos. 81, 32, the court determined that it
was the intent of the Framers, when drafting the Bankruptcy
Clause, to have states surrender both their legislative powers and
their sovereign immunity in relation to bankruptcy.89 In the
Federalist No. 81, Alexander Hamilton stated that:
it is inherent in the nature of sovereignty, not to be amenable to the
suit of an individual without its consent ... [and] the exemption is
now enjoyed by the government of every State in the Union. Unless,
therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the
convention it will remain with the States .... 90
Hamilton then referenced the article on taxation, The
Federalist No. 32, which discussed how immunity can be
alienated.9 The Federalist No. 32 lists three circumstances where

Fourteenth Amendment is likewise not an issue in the argument because
section 106(a) and the Bankruptcy Code in general were not enacted to
"remedy violations of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 762 n. 1.
85. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. The clause grants Congress the power to
establish ". . . uniform laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the

United States." Id.
86. Hood 1, 319 F.3d at 763 (quoting Sturges v. Crowinshield, 17 U.S. 122
(1819)). The court gave an insightful argument against the Fourth Circuit's
interpretation in In re Creative Goldsmiths that the Commerce and

Bankruptcy Clauses are to be treated similarly. Id. The Sixth Circuit looked
at the context in which Justice Marshall made that statement and concluded
that Marshall only meant that the Bankruptcy Clause did not give Congress
less power. Id. (citing Hoffman v. Conn. Dep't of Income Maint., 492 U.S. 96,
111 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting)). He never addressed whether the
Bankruptcy Clause granted Congress more power. Id.

87. Id. at 763. The issue in question was taken from Justice Frankfurter's
concurring opinion. Id.
88. Id. at 764.
89. Id. at 765.
90. THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton).
91. THE FEDERALIST No. 32 (Alexander Hamilton).
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The court in Hood determined
state sovereignty is alienated.'
that the logic of the third circumstance, where the Constitution
of
grants a power to the federal government, and a State's exercise
93
bankruptcy.
to
applies
inconsistent,
be
would
power
the same
Put concisely, the circuit court in Hood determined that state
sovereign immunity, in relation to bankruptcy, was "altered by the
plan of the Convention" and, thus, the Bankruptcy Clause does
grant Congress the authority to abrogate state sovereign
immunity."
C. On One Hand: The Supreme Court's Reasoning Behind Hood
The Supreme Court had an opportunity to address the split in
the circuits when it granted certiorari in Hood.95 Instead, the
Court went in a completely different direction and reached its
decision on an application of the bankruptcy court's in rem
jurisdiction.' The Court based its reasoning on California v. Deep
Sea Research,"' in which it held that "the Eleventh Amendment
does not bar federal jurisdiction over in rem admiralty actions
when the state is not in possession of the property."98 Because a
bankruptcy case is also an in rem proceeding in which the State
does not possess the property in question, the Court applied a
similar line of reasoning.' The Court stated that "[a]lthough both
bankruptcy and admiralty are specialized areas of the law, we see

92. Id. The three circumstances are: 1) when the Constitution expressly
grants an exclusive power to the federal government; 2) where the
Constitution grants power to the federal government and forbids the states
from possessing the same power; and 3) where the Constitution grants a
power to the federal government, and although it does not grant such a power
exclusively to the federal government, nor forbid the states from sharing it,
states exercising such power would be "absolutely and totally contradictory
and repugnant"to the Constitution. Id.
93. Hood I, 319 F.3d at 766. Hamilton used the power of naturalization as
his example of the third circumstance, and the court in Hood concluded that
the same reasoning applies to bankruptcy. Id.
94. Id. at 767.
95. Hood 1I, 541 U.S. at 452-53. The Court based its decision on the fact
that the bankruptcy court's exercise of its in rem jurisdiction would not offend
the Eleventh Amendment. Id. Since the Court found that no in personam
jurisdiction is necessary in discharging debt, the question of States' sovereign
immunity was not reached. Id. at 452-53.
96. Id. at 443.
97. 523 U.S. 491 (1998).
98. See Hood 11, 541 U.S. at 446 (concluding that "the Eleventh
Amendment does not bar jurisdiction of a federal court over an in rem
admiralty action where the res is not within the State's possession") (citing
Deep Sea, 523 U.S. at 494-95).
99. Hood 11, 541 U.S. at 447. The Supreme Court stated "[tihe discharge of
a debt by a bankruptcy court is similarly an in rem proceeding. Bankruptcy
courts have exclusive jurisdiction over a debtor's property, wherever located,
and over the estate." Id.
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no reason why the exercise of federal courts' in rem bankruptcy
jurisdiction is more threatening to state sovereignty than the
exercise of their in rem admiralty jurisdiction."'" The ultimate
conclusion of the majority was that a bankruptcy proceeding is not
a suit against a state, which precludes the invocation of the
Eleventh Amendment. 01
D. On the Other Hand: The Dissent's Logic
The dissent by Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, °"
believed that due to the similarities between bankruptcy
proceedings and civil litigation, the majority should have relied on
Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports
Authority to reach its decision." s In Federal Maritime, the Court
ruled that a cruise ship company's complaint against the South
Carolina State Ports Authority for violation of the Shipping Act
was barred by the Eleventh Amendment."' The Court in Federal
Maritime reasoned that the Framers would have found it just as
offensive for a State to be subjected to suit in an Article I court as
an Article III court."°a The Court's reasoning heavily relied on the
similarities between Federal Maritime Commission (FMC)

100. Id. at 451.

101. Id.

Justices Souter and Ginsburg concur except for any implicit

approval of Seminole. Id. at 455.
102. See id. at 455-464 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (highlighting the majority's
failure to address the issue for which certiorari was granted). The dissent
characterized the in rem argument that the majority relied on as "irrelevant to
this case" as well as "complex and uncertain." Id. at 456.
103. Id. at 457. The dissent felt that the similarities between civil litigation
and Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) proceeding, which caused the Court
to determine that State sovereign immunity prevented states from appearing
before a FMC proceeding against their will, were in line with the similarities
between federal civil litigation and bankruptcy proceedings. Id. Therefore,
according to the logic employed in Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. So. Car. State Ports
Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002), the same result should be reached in Hood. Id.
The similarities include the fact that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
control a large part of both proceedings. Id. Additionally, the rules governing
the discovery process are similar in both bankruptcy and civil litigation. Id.
104. Federal Maritime, 535 U.S. at 747. The Federal Maritime Commission
is an administrative tribunal granted its authority by Article I, as are
bankruptcy courts. Id. at 750; U.S. CONST. art I, § 8.
105. See Hood H, 541 U.S. at 457 (citing an explanation in FederalMaritime,
535 U.S. 743).
[11f the Framers would have found it an 'impermissible affront to a
State's dignity to be required to answer the complaints of private parties
in federal courts,' the Framers would have found it equally
impermissible to compel States to do so simply because the adjudication
takes place in an Article I rather than an Article III court.
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proceedings and civil litigation to reach its decision.0 6 Since
bankruptcy proceedings are also very similar to civil litigation, the
Eleventh Amendment would apply." 7
The dissent also focused on the fact that a bankruptcy
proceeding is adversarial in nature, and although it does not
necessarily require the State to defend itself in the same manner
as it would in a civil suit, "the effect is the same, whether done by
adversary proceeding or by motion, and whether the proceeding is
in personam or in rem. To preserve its rights, the State is
compelled either to subject itself to the Bankruptcy court's
jurisdiction or to forfeit its rights." ° These similarities to civil
litigation are precisely the indignities that the Eleventh
Amendment was designed to prevent)' 9
E.

The Current Situation:Now What?

The current situation leaves us with three separate analyses
of section 106(a): first, the Sixth Circuit that found section 106(a)
constitutional; second, the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and
Ninth Circuits that found section 106(a) unconstitutional; and
finally, the Supreme Court, which did not reach the question and
relied instead on the court's in rem jurisdiction."0

106. Hood 11, 541 U.S. at 457 (citing Federal Maritime and explaining the

similarities between FMC proceedings and civil litigation).
concluded that:

The Court

FMC's rules governing pleadings and discovery are very similar to the
analogous Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Moreover... "the role of
the [administrative law judge], the impartial officer designated to hear a
case, is similar to that of an Article III judge." (citations omitted) Based
on these similarities, we held that, for purposes of state sovereign
immunity, the adjudication before the FMC was indistinguishable from
an adjudication in an Article III tribunal.
Id.
107. Id. at 457. See supra note 103 (explaining the similar logic).
108. Hood 11, 451 U.S. at 459.
109. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The similarities to civil litigation may be
sufficient to qualify as a "suit in law or equity;" therefore, to force a state to
participate without its consent would be expressly prohibited by the Eleventh
Amendment. Id.
110. See Hood, 319 F.3d at 767 (holding that section 106(a) is constitutional
because states granted Congress the power to abrogate their sovereign
immunity under the Bankruptcy Clause when they ratified the constitution);
Sacred Heart, 133 F.3d at 245 (ruling that Congress may not abrogate state
sovereign immunity pursuant to any Article I power and that section 106(a)
was not enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment and is therefore
unconstitutional); In re Creative Goldsmiths, 119 F.3d at 1147 (holding that
Congress cannot use the Bankruptcy Clause to circumvent the Eleventh
Amendment restriction on the federal court's jurisdiction over states, and
section 106(a) was not enacted pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and likewise does not protect a right guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment; therefore section 106(a) is unconstitutional);
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IV.

THE OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE

One important role of the Supreme Court is to grant certiorari
in order to address splits in the circuit courts. 1 ' By not addressing
the constitutionality of section 106(a), the Supreme Court, in this
instance, has failed in this role. Instead of having an issue
resolved, there may be even more confusion than before. There
are at least three legally sound analyses of the constitutionality of
section 106(a)." ' This section will examine the pros and cons of
each argument. It also proposes that the Supreme Court adopt the
best of these arguments, namely the reasoning of the Sixth
Circuit, and accordingly hold that section 106(a) is constitutional.
A.

The Majority Is Not Always Right

The conclusion reached by most circuits is that section 106(a)
is unconstitutional, thus States can exercise their Eleventh
Amendment immunity and avoid submitting themselves to the
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court."" In light of Seminole, this is
the simplest argument to make."' However, it is also the most
dangerous. By allowing States to avoid the jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy court by exercising its Eleventh Amendment

Fernandez, 123 F.3d at 246 (holding that section 106(a) is unconstitutional,
because Congress cannot find the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity
in either Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Bankruptcy Clause);
Nelson, 301 F.3d at 838 (holding that states did not waive their immunity by
ratifying the constitution, and Congress lacks the authority pursuant to
Article I necessary to abrogate that immunity); Mitchell, 209 F.3d at 1121
(relying on Seminole and holding that Congress cannot use Article I to
abrogate state sovereign immunity, and even if Congress did act pursuant to
the Fourteenth Amendment, they did not satisfy the "congruence"
requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment); Hood 11, 451 U.S. at 454-55
(declining to answer the question of the constitutionality of section 106(a) and
instead granting the bankruptcy court jurisdiction based on in rem
jurisdiction).
111. See ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 226 (8th ed.

2002) (stating that a "prime" purpose of granting certiorari is to bring
uniformity among the different courts of appeals). See also SuP. CT. R. 10(A)
(naming circuit splits as a reason for granting certiorari).
112. See infra Part III and corresponding endnotes (outlining the three
distinct arguments regarding the constitutionality of section 106(a)).
113. See Sacred Heart, 133 F.3d at 245 (holding that section 106(a) is
unconstitutional); In re Creative Goldsmiths, 119 F.3d at 1147 (holding that
section 106(a) is unconstitutional); Fernandez, 123 F.3d at 246 (holding that
section 106(a) is unconstitutional); Nelson, 301 F.3d at 838 (holding that
section 106(a) is unconstitutional); Mitchell, 209 F.3d at 1121 (holding that
section 106(a) is unconstitutional).
114. The circuit courts lumped all Article I powers together and quickly
decided that Seminole applied equally to all of them. Sacred Heart, 133 F.3d
at 245; In re Creative Goldsmiths, 119 F.3d at 1147; Fernandez, 123 F.3d at
246; Nelson, 301 F.3d at 838; Mitchell, 209 F.3d at 1121. This is obviously
easier than trying to distinguish one Article I power from the rest.
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immunity, the two main tenets of bankruptcy are undermined."5
Adopting this line of reasoning would make states a kind of "ubercreditor," able to avoid discharge, and essentially make any debts
owed to them non-dischargeable.
Under this interpretation, Julie will not be able to discharge
her student loans, even if a bankruptcy court finds that those
loans burden her with an undue hardship." 6 Julie will not be
provided with a fresh start, and her other creditors will not be
treated fairly. This is because she will have to pay off her student
loans in full, while her other creditors will likely receive nothing."7
This result is overly harsh, especially when one considers that
it is merely the unanticipated confluence of Seminole, in which a8
State did not want to negotiate in good faith with Indian tribes,
and the fear of being forced to pay a Revolutionary War debt
caused by Chisholm."' The Supreme Court was correct in not
adopting this line of reasoning, but should have taken it one-step
further by expressly overruling it. With careful wording, the
Court could avoid opening the door to abrogation via other Article
I powers.
B. Is a Technicality the Answer?
Perhaps the Supreme Court realized that finding section
106(a) unconstitutional would undermine the main philosophy of
bankruptcy when it decided Hood."' Apparently unwilling to
disturb the general rule of Seminole, that Congress cannot
abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to an Article I
power,"' but also wanting to avoid the unfortunate result of
declaring section 106 (a) unconstitutional,"2 the Supreme Court

115. The danger lies in the marginalization of the two main tenets of
bankruptcy. By liberally applying Seminole to all Article I powers, the ability
of debtors to get a fresh start and for creditors to receive fair treatment is
potentially harmed.
116. Since the bankruptcy court does not have jurisdiction over the state or
state agencies, it will not be able to discharge the student loans unless the
state consents.
117. Julie will likely need all her assets to pay off the loans.
118. Seminole, 517 U.S. 44. The case did not concern bankruptcy, at least on
the facts. Id. at 47. Rather, it dealt with Florida's duty to negotiate with the

Seminole tribe in good faith. Id.
119. Chisholm, 2 U.S. 419. It was the "shock and surprise" generated by this
decision that apparently caused Congress to quickly answer with the Eleventh
Amendment. Welch, 483 U.S. at 484.
120. Hood H, 451 U.S. 440.
121. See Seminole, 517 U.S. at 72 (stating in broad terms that Article I

powers may not be utilized to avoid the constitutional limitations the Eleventh
Amendment places on federal jurisdiction pursuant to Article III).
122. See supra Part I (stating that the unfortunate result is the inability for
the debtor to get a fresh start and the inability of other creditors to be treated
fairly when a state or state agency is involved).
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arrived at its own approach.12 ' By deciding that the bankruptcy
court's jurisdiction was based on in rem2 jurisdiction, the Court was
attempting to avoid deciding the issue.11
1.

The Good

The Supreme Court's approach has a few advantages. In the
majority of cases, it will allow a debtor to discharge debts owed to
a state or state agency. 12 Furthermore, it will allow the debtor to
get a fresh start and the creditors to be treated fairly by requiring
the state to abide by the bankruptcy court's judgment, whether it
participates in the proceeding or not."' By affirming the ability of
the bankruptcy court to provide a fresh start for the debtor and
fair treatment for the creditors, this approach is significantly
better than simply ruling section 106(a) unconstitutional.
This approach also maintains a State's sovereign immunity.
By relying on in rem jurisdiction, the Eleventh Amendment is not
implicated.'27 This allows the Court to protect the tenets of
bankruptcy without threatening State sovereign immunity in
other situations." The Supreme Court has used a scalpel to cut a
small hole for bankruptcy without inadvertently granting
Congress the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity in other
situations.19

123. See Hood 11, 451 U.S. at 452-55 (explaining that the bankruptcy court's
in rem jurisdiction does not implicate the Eleventh Amendment and therefore,
there is no need to rule on the constitutionality of section 106 (a)).
124. Id. at 443. The Court expressly says that it is not deciding the issue for
which certiorari was granted but is instead ruling based on an alternative
argument. Id.
125. The bankruptcy court still must make a finding that the loans present
an undue hardship on the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(8). Additionally, the
majority hints at other situations that may arise that would cause the
bankruptcy court to exceed its in rem jurisdiction. Hood 1I, 451 U.S. at 455. It
does not enumerate these situations choosing, instead, to label them
"hypothetical." Id.
126. Because Hood II will not allow the state to assert its Eleventh
Amendment immunity, the state must either participate in the proceedings or
waive its rights and abide by the decision of the bankruptcy court. 451 U.S. at
454.
127. See id. at 451 (finding no reason that the bankruptcy court's in rem
jurisdiction would "infringe" upon state sovereign immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment).
128. Hood II would have no impact on adversarial proceedings or other civil
litigation not based on the court's in rem jurisdiction. Id. However, if the in
rem jurisdiction is exceeded, then Eleventh Amendment sovereignty becomes a
viable defense again. Id. at 455.
129. Id. Again, this is a fairly narrow ruling applying only to bankruptcy
and arguably other proceedings, such as admiralty, that are premised on the
in rem jurisdiction of the court. Id.
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The Bad

What is wrong with the Supreme Court's approach on this
issue?130 The very nature of in rem jurisdiction is based on
possession of the property. 3 ' This approach seems to work fine in
most situations. However, what if one month before declaring
bankruptcy, Julie paid $1,000 to a state for back taxes? Normally,
a bankruptcy court could order that money returned to the
bankruptcy estate to be divided appropriately amongst the
creditors. 32 If the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction is in rem, it may
not be able to force the state to return the money because the
bankruptcy estate does not have possession of the property, in this
the wellIn this and similar situations,
case the $1,000.33
intentioned approach of Hood breaks down.
3.

The Ugly

In addition to the problems inherent in in rem jurisdiction
described above, this approach is simply an attempt to fix the
constitutionality problem of section 106(a) with a proverbial bandaid. Instead of validating the section of the Code, the Court has
attempted to bypass section 106(a) and still reach the same result.
Putting a "band-aid" on the Bankruptcy Code will not be as
effective as resolving the real issue, especially when working with
something as complex as the Bankruptcy Code.
130. According to the dissent in Hood II, there are at least two problems.
451 U.S. at 455-458 (Thomas, J., dissenting). In rem jurisdiction is complex
and uncertain and the adversarial nature of the bankruptcy proceeding clearly
implicates the Eleventh Amendment. Id.
131. See Hood 11, 451 U.S. at 446-47 (explaining the reach of the bankruptcy
court's in rem jurisdiction). The Court states that the court has "exclusive
jurisdiction over a debtor's property, wherever located, and over the estate."
Id. at 447. They continue by explaining that the court is able to give a debtor
a fresh start because jurisdiction "derives not from jurisdiction over the state
or other creditors, but rather from jurisdiction over debtors and their estates."
Id at 447-48. Finally, the court's in rem jurisdiction allows it to determine the
claims that anyone has to the particular property in question; the parties do
not need to participate in the action. Id. at 448.
132. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2005) (allowing a debtor to avoid a transfer of
property to a creditor under certain circumstances).
133. The bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over the property must be certain,
otherwise state sovereignty may be infringed upon. Hood 1I, 451 U.S. at 44849. Earlier, the Court stated that the bankruptcy court does have jurisdiction
over the debtor's property no matter where it is located. Id. at 448. The ruling
in Hood II makes it unclear whether the bankruptcy court has the authority to
order the property returned to the estate.
134. The Court recognizes that there may be situations in which the
bankruptcy court might exceed its in rem jurisdiction and implicate the
Eleventh Amendment, but characterizes these situations as "hypothetical."
Id. at 455. Presumably, such situations would arise when the property in
question is not clearly the debtor's, or when such proceedings became too
adversarial.
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C. The PathLess Traveled
Although clearly in the minority on the issue, the Sixth
Circuit provides the most compelling and reasonable analysis of
all: that the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Code
grants Congress the authority to abrogate Eleventh Amendment
immunity. 3 ' Seemingly the simplest approach, which leaves the
Bankruptcy Code as written, in actuality it requires an in-depth
understanding of the very formation of the Constitution.3 '
Regardless of its apparent simplicity, the argument utilized by the
Sixth Circuit in Hood is the most satisfying.13 '
1.

All the Strengths of in rem...

Declaring section 106(a) as constitutional would deliver all of
the benefits of the Supreme Court's "in rem jurisdiction" approach.
It would protect the two main tenets of bankruptcy.3 8 The plain
language of section 106(a) eliminates any possible argument a
9
state could make to avoid jurisdiction.
Bankruptcy would return
40
days.
to its "pre-Seminole"
In addition to restoring the main purposes of bankruptcy, this
approach would be a much neater and more holistic analysis than
the in rem jurisdiction theory. Section 106(a) was intended to fit
into the larger overall Bankruptcy Code. It is a piece of the overall
puzzle, and as such fits much better into the code than any "bandaid" approach.
2. But none of the weaknesses
Not only does this approach restore the fresh start and fair
treatment of bankruptcy, it does so in all cases.
Because
jurisdiction is not premised on the property, even in situations
where the State is in possession of the property, the State will still

135. See supra Part III.B (explaining in detail the Sixth Circuit's analysis of
the issue).
136. See id. (explaining the role that the formation of the Constitution had in
the court's conclusion that section 106(a) was constitutional).
137. Hood I, 319 F.3d 755.

138. See supra Part I (stating that the two tenets are, of course, the fresh
start for the debtor and the fair treatment of creditors).
139. The section is titled "Waiver of sovereign immunity" and expressly
states that "sovereign immunity is abrogated.... " 11 U.S.C. § 106(a).
Predictably enough, the courts have not struggled with the intent of this
section. See, e.g., In re Creative Goldsmiths, 119 F.3d. at 1144 (stating that
there is no doubt that Congress intended to abrogate state sovereign immunity
in section 106(a)).
140. See Gibson, supra notes 22, 23 (stating that it was Seminole that
determined that Congress lacked authority under Article I to validly abrogate
state sovereign immunity). Prior to Seminole, it was assumed that section
106(a) was valid. Id.
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Under this
be unable to avoid the bankruptcy proceedings.'
approach, there will be less litigation in the future because the law
jurisdiction,
is clear; states cannot avoid the bankruptcy court's
1 2
regardless of who is in possession of the property.
Finally, the Supreme Court could eliminate any possible
deterioration of the power of the Eleventh Amendment by
expressly upholding Seminole, unambiguously basing this
"bankruptcy exception" on the uniformity provision of the
bankruptcy clause." This, combined with the broad language of
Seminole,'" should prevent any future attempts by Congress to
abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to an Article I power.
V.

CONCLUSION

Confusion on this issue is evident from the multitude of
approaches and conclusions different courts have reached. Until
the Supreme Court ultimately addresses this question and
provides the lower courts with a definitive answer, the present
confusion will persist. The most effective way to eliminate the
confusion and protect the debtor's fresh start and creditors' fair
treatment, the two tenants intended by Framers, is to hold section
106(a) constitutional.
VI. CENTRAL VIRGINIA COMMUNITY COLLEGE V. KATZ

After this comment was written, and shortly before
publication, the Supreme Court handed down a 5-4 decision in
Central Virginia Community College v. Katz."" Relying heavily on
the history of the Bankruptcy Clause, the Court determined that a
bankruptcy trustee's proceeding to set aside preferential transfers6
to state agencies is not barred by state sovereign immunity.'
Although at first glance, it appears that the question of state
sovereign immunity and section 106 (a) of the bankruptcy code raised by Seminole Tribe and avoided in Hood - has finally been
141. State sovereign immunity is waived under section 106(a) and therefore
the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction extends to the state as a creditor. 11
U.S.C. § 106(a).
142. The clear cut language of section 106(a) leaves significantly less room
for debate than the vague "hypothetical" situations mentioned in Hood H. 451
U.S. at 455. The Court even states that if the bankruptcy court exceeds its in
rem jurisdiction it can be challenged by a state. Id.
143. Because the only time that the word "uniform" appears in Article I is in
relation to bankruptcy and naturalization, basing an exception to Seminole on
uniformity will distinguish it from other Article I powers. U.S. CONST. art. I, §

8, cl. 4.
144. See Seminole, 517 U.S. at 72 (treating all Article I powers similarly and
ruling that no Article I power may be used to abrogate state sovereign
immunity).

145. 126 S.Ct. 990 (2006).
146. Id. at 904.
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answered, the Court instead redefined the question. Rather than
deciding whether Congress has the power to abrogate state
sovereign immunity pursuant to the Article I Bankruptcy Clause,
the Court declared that question to be irrelevant. According to the
majority, "[tihe [relevant] question, rather, is whether Congress'
determination that States should be amenable to [preferential
transfer] proceedings is within the scope of its power to enact
Bankruptcies.' We think it beyond
'Laws on the subject 14of
7
peradventure that it is." '
The Court continues to rely heavily on the in rem nature of
bankruptcy. The majority concludes that the States agreed to
subordinate their sovereign immunity to "effectuate the in rem
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts." 148 This historical conclusion
fails to take into account the fact that the Eleventh Amendment
had yet to be passed, and, as the dissent points out, "the States are
not subject to suit by private parties for monetary relief absent
their consent or a valid congressional abrogation, and it is 'settled
doctrine' that nothing in Article I of the Constitution establishes
those preconditions."
Although this case goes along way towards resolving the
issue left open by Hood, the original question remains as to
whether section 106 (a) was a valid exercise of Congress' power.

147. Id. at 1005.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1005-06 (Thomas, J. dissenting).

